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SUMMARY: I.INTRODUCTION. THE CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC COMPETITION. II. EU GRICULTURAL 
POLICY. MATERIAL AND PERSONAL SCOPE. MAIN OBJECTIVES.  III. COMPETITION RULES IN THE 
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Resumen: Existen diferentes conceptos de competencia presentada en el artículo. Por otra 
parte, el artículo presenta diversos objetivos de política de competencia y de la normativa de 
protección de la competencia. A continuación, se describen sus objetivos y la política agrícola 
común. El objetivo de dicha descripción es comparar objetivos generales de la regulación de 
la protección de la competencia con los objetivos de la política agrícola común y Desarrollo 
Rural. Notable, que esos objetivos no son que lejos de uno a por lo tanto, las normas de 
competencia tienen ciertos objetivos sociales y políticos así. Según arte. 42 del TFUE todas 
las reglas de competencia se aplican a la producción de y el comercio de productos agrícolas 
sólo en la medida determinada por el Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo general conforme a 
los principios y objetivos de la política agrícola común y Desarrollo Rural. Por lo tanto, los 
objetivos de la política agrícola de la UE prevalecen sobre las normas de competencia general 
(caso 139/79 Maizena GmbH v. Consejo). Un ámbito específico de aplicación de la exclusión 
de las normas de competencia general está regulado por Reglamento (CE) nº 1184/2006 del 
Consejo, de 24 de julio de 2006. Bajo mencionado Reglamento núm. 1184/2006 
organizaciones de mercado agrícola nacional y los acuerdos, decisiones y prácticas que son 
indispensables para lograr los objetivos de la política agrícola común, y las organizaciones y 
asociaciones de agricultores están excluidas de prohibición establecido por el arte. 101 s 1 de 
la TFUE. La exclusión no abarca la prohibición del arte. 102 del seminario. La organización 
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de los mercados agrícolas de EU es proporcionada por Reglamento nº 1308/2013 del 
Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 17 de diciembre de 2013. Uno de los buenos ejemplos 
de organización del mercado es el mercado diario (llamado ' paquete de la leche'). La reforma 
de la PAC 2014-2020 es para garantizar la competitividad y sostenibilidad del sector 
agropecuario mediante la mejora de la focalización y eficiencia de instrumentos de política. 
La reforma prevé la supresión gradual de las restricciones de producción (cuotas) en ciertos 
mercados (diario, azúcar, vino). Sin embargo, no hay ninguna liberalización real amueblado. 
Competencia en el sector agrícola sigue siendo 'competencia regulada de estado'. 
 
Abstract: There are different concepts of competition presented in the article. Moreover, the 
article presents different objectives of competition policy and of competition protection 
regulations. Then, the Common Agricultural Policy and its objectives are described. The goal 
of mentioned description is to compare general goals of competition protection regulation 
with the objectives of Common Agricultural Policy and Rural Development. Noteworthy, 
those goals are not that far from each other hence the competition rules have certain social 
and political objectives as well. According to art. 42 of TFEU all competition rules shall 
apply to production of and trade in agricultural products only to the extent determined by the 
European Parliament and the Council in compliance with general principles and objectives of 
the Common Agricultural Policy and Rural Development. Therefore, the objectives of EU 
agricultural policy prevail over the general competition rules (Case 139/79 Maizena GmbH v. 
Council). A specific scope of the exclusion from the EU general competition rules is 
regulated by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1184/2006 of 24 July 2006. Under mentioned 
Regulation No. 1184/2006 national agricultural market organizations, and agreements, 
decisions and practices which are indispensable to accomplish the objectives of Common 
Agricultural Policy, and farmers’ organizations and associations are excluded from 
prohibition laid down by art. 101 sec 1 of the TFEU. The exclusion does not encompasses 
prohibition from art. 102 of the TFUE. The EU organisation of the agricultural markets is 
provided by Regulation No. 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
December 2013. One of good examples of market organisation is the diary market (so-called 
‘Milk Package’). The CAP Reform 2014-2020 is to guarantee competitiveness and 
sustainability of the agricultural sector by improving the targeting and efficiency of policy 
instruments. The reform provides for gradual removal of production constraints (quotas) in 
certain markets (sugar, diary, wine). Nevertheless, there is no real deregulation furnished. 
Competition in agricultural sector still remains ‘state regulated competition’. 
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 The term ‘competition’ takes its roots in Latin, where it meant originally ‘common 
quest’1. Nowadays the term ‘competition’ is generally understood as “a contest between 
organisms, animals, individuals, groups, etc., for territory, a niche, or a location of resources, 
for resources and goods, mates, for prestige, recognition, awards, or group or social status, for 
leadership. Competition is the opposite of cooperation”2. As in strictly economic sense the 
term competition means “the rivalry among sellers trying to achieve such goals as increasing 
profits, market share, and sales volume by varying the elements of the marketing mix: price, 
product, distribution, and promotion”, “the effort of two or more parties acting independently 
to secure the business of a third party by offering the most favorable terms”3. According to 
great economist Alfred Marshall competition means just ‘contest’4. 
 Robert H. Bork in his fundamental essay “The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with 
Itself” (1978) distinguishes five major meanings of term „competition”. Firstly, competition is 
‘the process of rivalry’. Secondly, it is “the absence of restraint over one firm’s economic 
activities by another firm”. Thirdly, it is “a state of the market in which an individual buyer or 
seller does not influence price by his purchases or sales”. Fourthly, competition means a state 
in which given markets and sectors of the economy are fragmented into small units (atomization 
of the market). Lastly, competition is “a state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be 
increased by moving to alternative state of affairs through judicial decree”5. 
 Some economists say that the term of competition is irrelevant in fact. What is of a big 
importance these are characteristics, features of competition. Great Polish economist Professor 
Adam Noga points at some characteristics of competition like fear of competitors that 
motivates to more effective action, lack of enough space for all undertakings in a given sector 
of the economy, selection of undertakings and adjustment to the buyers’ needs6.  
 Robert Bork and Ward S. Bowman rightly state “(…) that is the essential mechanism 
of competition and its prime virtue that more efficient firms take business away from the less 
efficient”7.  
 Undoubtedly, a term ‘competition’ holds many meanings coming out of different points 
of view and from different scientific fields, like economy, sociology, political sciences, physics, 
chemistry, natural sciences, biology, etc. 
 Nevertheless, from a juridical point of view, it is rather crucial and necessary to define 
                                                          
1 See THE LISBON GROUP, Granice Konkurencji (Limits to Competition, Polish edition), Warszawa,1996, p. 5 
and p. 13. According to Latin dictionaries verb ‘competo’ (competo, competere, competivi, competitus) means, inter 
alia, ‘to solicit, to contest together, jointly’, ‘meet; happen at same time, coincide; agree; be candidate together’. 
WHITAKER W., “AbleMedia English-Latin Latin-English Dictionary: Competition”, retrieved on February 2, 
2015, in http://ablemedia.com/ctcweb/showcase/wordsonline.html. 
2 WIKIPEDIA, “Competition”,  retrieved on February 2, 2015, in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Competition. 
3 Ibidem. In addition: “Mirriam-Webster On-line Dictionary”, retrieved on February 1, 2015, in 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/competition. 
4 MARSHALL, A., Zasady ekonomii (Principles of economy), Volume I, Warszawa, 1925, p. 5. 
5 BORK, R.H., The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, New York, 1978, p. 58 ff. See on concept of 
consumer welfare: BORK, R.H., “Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare”, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 
77/1968, pp. 950-952. See additionally on concept of consumer welfare (and on so-called ‘total welfare’): 
GORMSEN LOVDAHL, L., A Principled Approach to Abuse of Dominance in European Competition Law, 
Cambridge, 2010, pp. 20-58; and AKMAN, P., The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law. Law and Economic 
Approaches, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2012, pp. 11-48.  
6 NOGA, A., ”Piąta fala konkurencji”, Roczniki Kolegium Analiz Ekonomicznych, Vol. 11/2003, p. 138. 
7 BORK, R.H., BOWMAN, W.S., “The Crisis in Antitrust”, Columbia Law Review, No. 3 (Vol. 65)/1965, p. 
364. 
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competition as to know what is a major goal of any law that is to protect competition.  
 Even though competition laws all over the world are a subject to strong globalization 
process and, henceforward, are much alike and standardized in their core elements8, notions of 
major goals of competition regulation are often differing among themselves.  
  It is noteworthy that the first modern competition law in the history, namely American 
Sherman Act of 18909, was not merely an act of the Congress which just regulated market, but it 
was „… an expression of a social philosophy, an educative force, and a political symbol of 
extraordinary potency”10. Moreover, mentioned law was adopted under a very strong social 
pressure11, put especially by American farmers in the second half of XIX (e.g. the National 
Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry12). 
 In majority of countries the competition law is based on two crucial prohibitions: a 
prohibition of anticompetitive agreements and a prohibition of an abuse of a dominant 
position (competition protection system based on the prohibition principle; germ. 
Verbotsprinzip). Nonetheless, there are still countries where there is competition law based on 
the system of control of abuses (germ. Missbrauchsprinzip)13. 
 The most universal system adopted by vast majority of countries all over the world 
refers to prohibitions (relative prohibition of anticompetitive agreements and rather per se 
prohibition of an abuse of a dominant position). This path is followed by the Treaty on 
Functioning of the European Union (henceforward: TFEU or ‘the Treaty’), namely articles 
101-102. 
 As far as the objectives of modern competition law concerned, there may be two clusters 
of objectives. First of all, there are objectives of economic nature (strictly economic goals), 
among which there are such elements (values) as: free market competition, consumer welfare, 
economic effectiveness (maximization of economic effectiveness)14. The point is, however, 
how the concept of ‘competition’ is understood. Most often competition is understood as a 
‘perfect competition’, meaning an atomistic market where there is unlimited number of 
economic units (numerous firms) and no “individual or firm could unilaterally influence 
                                                          
8 See e.g. GERBER, D.J., “Europe and the Globalization of Antitrust”, Connecticut Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 14/1999, p. 15 ff. See additionally following works: GERBER, D.J., “Constitutionalizing the Economy: 
German Neoliberalism, Competition Law and the ‘New’ Europe”, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 
Vol. 42/1994, p. 25 ff; GERBER, D.J., “Integration, Disintegration and the Protection of Competition: Of Images, 
Stories and Myths”, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 68/1992, p. 229 ff; and GERBER, D.J., “Antitrust Law and 
Economic Analysis: The Swedish Approach”, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review. Vol. 8/1984, 
p. 1 ff. 
9 July 2, 1890, ch 647, §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 210. Title 15, United States Code (U.S.C.) Sections 1-7. 
10 BORK, R.H., BOWMAN, W.S., supra, p. 364.  
11 See FURSE M., “The Role of Competition Policy: A Survey”, European Competition Law Review,  No. 4/1996, 
p. 254. See additionally: AREEDA, PH., KAPLOW, L., Antitrust Analysis. Problems, Text, Cases. Fifth Edition, 
Cambridge, 1997, p. 46. 
12 The organization (or movement) named ‘The National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry’ was founded by 
Olivier Hudson Kelly in XIX c. There were approximately 1.5 million farmers in mentioned organization, mainly 
from the western states of the USA. See DEMPSEY, P.S., “Transportation: A Legal History”, Transportation Law 
Journal, Vol. 30/2003, pp. 260-261, p. 263. 
13 Form example, the Swiss Cartel Act (Kartellrecht) of 1996 is based on the concept of control of abuses. See 
FRICK, T.A., BIRKHÄUSER, N., “New Developments in Swiss Competition Law and Foreign Undertakings”, 
Comparative Law Yearbook of International Business, Vol. 26/2004, p. 255 ff. 
14 See on economic effectiveness: AREEDA, PH., “Introduction to Antitrust Economics”, Antitrust Law Journal, 
Vol. 52/1983, pp. 524-525; and: AREEDA, PH., KAPLOW, L., supra, pp. 17 -18. 
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prices, output, or any other terms of trade”15. Many economists prefer the concept of so called 
‘workable competition’ or ‘effective competition’ which are concepts trying to reconcile both 
imperfections of the market in the imperfect world with the ideal of perfect, atomistic 
competition16. 
 The second cluster is of a social and political nature. Among those objectives it is worth 
to point at the aid for small and medium businesses, equal dispersion of economic and political 
power (redistribution of wealth, distribution of power in the society at large), protection of 
consumers against big business’ practices, safeguarding democratic mechanism, protection of 
certain sectors of economy which bear big social importance (like e.g. agriculture, fisheries, 
forestry, transportation etc.), security of energy supply, natural environment protection, etc.17 
Henceforward, as to summarize those listed objectives, it is right to use after Ignacio de León the 
term of ‘social optimum’18. 
 Moreover, within the European Union there is another very important objective of 
competition law – namely European integration and single European market19. David J. 
Gerber names it correctly ‘unification imperative’20. So the question may be posed how 
economic effectiveness and market integration can go together. Stephen Weatherill and Paul 
Beaumont rightly point that “Indeed, in the long term the two notions ought theoretically to be 
coterminous. Yet in the short term it is feasible that two objectives may clash”21.   
 The choice of priorities means a necessity of selecting legal instruments of realization 
of given objectives. The following question is a problem of relations between possible 
particular economic sector regulations and general competition regulation. A very good 
                                                          
15 See broad approach to the concept of perfect competition: MAKOWSKI, L., OSTROY, J.M., “Perfect 
Competition and the Creativity of the Market”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 39/June 2001, p. 479 ff. See 
additionally wide considerations on perfect competition and workable competition (in): MEESE, A.J., 
“Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of Firm”, Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 89/2005, pp. 772-808. 
16 See the concept of ‘workable competition’ in: CLARK, J.M., “Toward a Concept of Workable Competition”, The 
American Economic Review, No. 2 (Vol. 30)/1940, p. 241 ff. See additionally: DRAHOS, M., Convergence of 
Competition Laws and Policies in the European Community. Germany, Austria and Netherlands, The Hague–
London–Boston, 2001, pp. 40-41; and BISHOP, S., WALKER, M., Economics of E.C. Competition Law: 
Concepts, Application and Measurement, London–Dublin-Hong Kong, 1999, p. 13 ff. 
17 See CINI, M., MCGOWAN, L., Competition Policy in the European Union, New York, 1998, p. 4. See 
additionally: AKMAN, P., supra, p. 25; FURSE, M., supra, p. 250; and: LEÓN DE, I., “The Dillema of Regulating 
International Competition under the WTO System“, European Competition Law Review, No. 3/1997, p. 163. 
18 LEÓN DE, I., ibidem. 
19 Once in the past Valentine Korah bitterly stated that „Integration has been elevated by the Commission and the 
Court to a goal in itself, more important than efficiency”. KORAH, V., EEC Competition Policy – Legal Form or 
Economic Efficiency, Current Legal Problems, Oxford, 1986, p. 91. The question appears, however, whether that 
statement is up-to-date at present. See additionally: SZYSZCZAK, E., CYGAN, A., Understanding EU Law, First 
Edition, London, 2005, p. 81 ff; BERGH VAN DEN, R.J., CAMESASCA, P.D., European Competition Law and 
Economisc: A Comparative Perspective, 2nd Edition, London, 2006, p. 46; KON, S., SCHAEFFER, F., “Parallel 
Imports of Pharmaceutical Products: A New Realism, or Back to Basics”, European Competition Law Review, No. 
3/1997, p. 127; CRAIG, P., BÚRCA DE, G., EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials. Second Edition, Oxford 1998, p. 
923; BISHOP, S., WALKER, M., supra, p. 3 ff; GERBER, D.J., Integration, Disintegration and the Protection of 
Competition: of Images, Stories and Myths, supra, p. 237 and p. 239; and GERBER, D.J., “The Transformation of 
European Community Competition Law?”, Harvard International Law Journal, , No. 1 (Vol. 35)/1994,, pp. 98-
100; WEATHERILL, S., BEAUMONT, P., EC Law. The essential guide to the legal workings of the European 
Community, London-New York-Ringwood-Toronto-Auckland, 1993, p. 594. 
20 GERBER, D.J., “The Transformation of European Community Competition Law?”, supra, p. 98. 
21 WEATHERILL, S., BEAUMONT, P., supra, p. 594. 
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example of such relation is the European Union’s agriculture sector. So when answering the 
question about competition in the EU agriculture sector it is indispensable to analyze how far  
the general competition rules are binding for the EU agriculture businesses (material scope of 
general competition rules).  
 For the purpose of this article the EU competition rules are understood as art. 101 and 
art. 102 of TFEU. The question of state aid (viz. articles 107-108 of TFEU), although of a big 
relevance, remains outside present considerations. Without any doubt, the latter mentioned 
question deserves a separate broad legal analysis.  
 
II. EU AGRICULTURAL POLICY. MATERIAL AND PERSONAL SCOPE. 
MAIN OBJECTIVES  
 Common Agricultural Policy, introduced in 1962, is one of the EU’s oldest policies22. 
Primarily, CAP had such objectives as to increase agricultural production, to stabilize the 
agricultural markets, to provide for food security for citizens of the Member States, to protect 
farmers families’ standard and quality of life, to maintain reasonable prices for food products, 
etc. All those mentioned objectives related to the post-World War II conditions, characterized 
by shortage of food, hunger and other social problems. Now-a-days the objectives have 
changed in a natural way. Now the Policy encompasses such aims as animal welfare, farmer 
training, land management, environmental development and control of pollution, rural 
development, climate stability and even securing biodiversity and protection of wildlife23. 
 According to art. 38 sec. 1 TFEU agricultural products mean the products of the soil, 
of stockfarming and of fisheries and products of first-stage processing directly related to these 
products. It must be noted that the term ‘products of first-stage processing’ is not defined by 
the Treaty. Under the judicature (case law; French: jurisprudence) of Court of Justice of the 
European Union when approaching the term of ‘products of first-stage processing’ the most 
important is the factor of economic relation between basis agricultural product and processed 
product. “The concept of 'products of first-stage processing directly related' to basic products 
must, accordingly, be interpreted as implying a clear economic interdependence between 
basic products and products resulting from a productive process, irrespective of the number of 
operations involved therein. Processed products which have undergone a productive process, 
the cost of which is such that the price of the basic agricultural raw materials becomes a 
completely marginal cost, are therefore excluded”24. Consequently, the crucial role is played 
                                                          
22 See on the history of agricultural sector in Europe and on the beginning of CAP in, inter alia, KAPTEYN, P.J.G., 
THEMAAT VAN, P.VL., Introduction to the Law of the European Communities. From Maastricht to Amsterdam. 
Third Edition, London–The Hague–Boston, 1998, pp. 1128-1134. See also: TROITINO, D.R., CHOCHIA, A., 
“The Common Agricultural Policy, It’s Role in European Integration and Influence on the Enlargements of the 
Organization (Case Study: Georgia)”, International and Comparative Law Review, No. 1 (Vol. 13)/2013, pp. 37-
42.  
23 See: READ P.K., “28 Countries and One Common Agricultural Policy: European Family Farmers and 
Agricultural Reform. Foodtank 19 May 2014”, retrieved on January 28, 2015, in 
http://foodtank.com/news/2014/05/counries-and-one-common-agricultural-policy-eu; “Overview of CAP Reform 
2014-2020, European Commission, Agricultural Policy Perspectives Brief, No. 5/December 2013”, pp.1-2,  
retrieved on January 28, 2015, in http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/policy-perspectives/policy-briefs/05_en.pdf; see 
also: “New EU reforms fail European wildlife. University of Cambridge”, retrieved on January 28, 2015, in 
http://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/new-eu-reforms-fail-european-wildlife. 
24 See Case 185/73 Hauptzollamt Bielefeld v. Offene Handelgesellschaft in Firma H.C. König, sec. 13. E.C.R. 
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by comparison of cost of basic agricultural product with cost of products of first-stage 
processing. 
 In terms of personal scope, the EU agricultural policy encompasses farmers (farming 
producers). The term ‘farmer’ is not defined by the Treaty. It is widely accepted that a farmer 
means a person bearing 3 characteristics: firstly, there must be a direct economic management 
over production unit in the agricultural sector. Secondly, there must be direct risk related to 
agricultural activity borne by a person. Thirdly, in case of natural person, there must be right 
to social security benefits under a given Member State law. 
 According to Council Regulation (EC) No. 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing 
common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy 
and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) 
No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1782/200325, ‘farmer’ means natural or legal person, or a group of natural or legal persons, 
whatever legal status is granted to the group and its members by national law, whose holding 
is situated within Community territory, as defined in Article 299 of the Treaty, and who 
exercises an agricultural activity (art. 2 point a of the Council Regulation No 73/2009). The 
term ‘holding’ means all the production units managed by a farmer situated within the 
territory of the same Member State (art. 2 point b f the Council Regulation No 73/2009). 
‘Agricultural activity’ means the production, rearing or growing of agricultural products 
including harvesting, milking, breeding animals and keeping animals for farming purposes, or 
maintaining the land in good agricultural and environmental condition (art. 2 point c of the 
Council Regulation No 73/2009). Moreover, besides above terms, ‘agricultural area’ means 
any area taken up by arable land, permanent pasture or permanent crops (art. 2 point h of the 
Council Regulation No 73/2009)26. 
 In the past, European law defined the term ‘farmer’ in a different way. For example, 
under the Council Directive 72/159/EEC of 17 April 1972 on the modernization of farms27 
farmer meant a person who: firstly, practises farming as his main occupation; secondly, 
possesses adequate occupational skill and competence; thirdly, undertakes that from the start 
of the development plan he will keep accounts as defined in article 11 of Directive; and 
fourthly, draws up a plan for the development of the farm business which satisfies the 
conditions laid down in article 4 of Directive. Later regulations demanded a farmer to gain at 
least half of his/her income from agricultural activities and to devote at least half of labour 
time for agricultural activities28. 
 At present, it is quite clear that farmer may mean both natural and legal person. Not 
that far ago an answer to the question whether legal person may be treated as farmer under 
European regulation was not that obvious. In Case 312/85 SpA Villa Banfi v. Regione 
Toscana and others the Italian Government claimed that 'a farmer practising farming as his 
main occupation', means, apart from natural persons, only agricultural cooperatives and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1974, 607; see additionally Case 85/77 Societa Santa Anna v INPS, E.C.R. 1978, 527. 
25 OJ L 30, 31.01.2009, p. 16. 
26 Same definitions were provided by previous Council Regulation No. 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003 
establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing 
certain support schemes for farmers, art. 2. OJ L 270, 21.10.2003, p. 1. 
27 OJ L 96, 23.04.1972, p. 1. 
28 See JURCEWICZ., A., KOZŁOWSKA, B., TOMKIEWICZ., E., Wspólna Polityka Rolna. Zagadnienia prawne, 
Warszawa, 2004, p. 33. 
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farmers’ associations. So the Court clearly stated in its Judgment of 18 December 1986 that 
‘farmer’ means not only natural person, but legal person as well29. 
 The formal objectives of the CAP are prescribed by art. 39 sec. 1 of TFUE. Firstly, the 
Common Agricultural Policy shall intend to increase agricultural productivity by promoting 
technical progress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the 
optimum utilisation of the factors of production, in particular labour. Secondly, it shall 
guarantee a fair standard of living for all members of the agricultural community. According 
to the Treaty it shall be realized, inter alia, by means of increasing the individual earnings of 
all persons engaged in agriculture. Thirdly, it shall guarantee stabilization of markets. 
Fourthly, it shall guarantee reasonable prices for all consumers. In the course of 
accomplishment of all listed objectives, the particular characteristics of the agricultural sector 
shall be taken into consideration, like: the very special nature of agricultural activity, which 
results from the social structure of agriculture and from structural and natural disparities 
between the various agricultural regions; the need to effect the appropriate adjustments 
gradually; the fact that in all Member States agriculture constitutes a sector closely linked 
with the economy as a whole; and the fact that agriculture constitutes a sector closely linked 
with the economy as a whole (art. 39 sec. 2 of TFEU). 
 It comes out quite transparently from the above that agricultural policy is to achieve 
goals of economic nature (e.g. growth of productivity in agriculture) and of a socio-political 
nature (e.g. maintenance of adequate standard of living and growth of farmers’ income) at the 
same time. Those goals rest in a blatant contradiction with each other30. According to the 
Court of Justice a preference in terms of accomplishment of certain given objectives 
prescribed by the Treaty rest within the competence of the Community’s institutions. The 
Court of Justice named such preferences ‘temporary priorities’31. 
 The modern objectives of the EU policy in the agriculture sector are quite more 
complex than it was in the beginning. For example, Regulation No. 1305/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural 
development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and 
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 1698/200532 defines the mission of EAFRD as “… the 
development of a Union agricultural sector that is more territorially and environmentally 
balanced, climate-friendly and resilient and competitive and innovative. It shall also 
contribute to the development of rural territories” (art. 3 of Regulation No. 1305/2013). Then, 
the objectives are defined as: fostering the competitiveness of agriculture, ensuring the 
sustainable management of natural resources, and climate action, and achieving a balanced 
territorial development of rural economies and communities including the creation and 
maintenance of employment (art. 4 of Regulation No. 1305/2013). Moreover, among the 
priorities are: fostering knowledge transfer and innovation in agriculture, forestry, and rural 
areas; enhancing farm viability and competitiveness of all types of agriculture in all regions 
and promoting innovative farm technologies and the sustainable management of forests; 
                                                          
29 See Case 312/85 SpA Villa Banfi, sections 10-11. E.C.R. 1986, 4039. 
30 See numerous European courts’ cases: Case 5/67 W. Beus GmbH v. Hauptzollamt München, E.C.R. 1968, 83; 
Case 5/73 Balkan-Import-Export GmbH v Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof, E.C.R. 1973, 1091; Case 71/74 
Nederlandse Vereniging voor Fruit en Groentenimporthandel and others (FRUBO) v. Commission, E.C.R. 1975, 
563. 
31 See Case 5/73 Balkan-Import-Export GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof, E.C.R. 1973, 1112. 
32 OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 487. 
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promoting food chain organisation, including processing and marketing of agricultural 
products, animal welfare and risk management in agriculture; restoring, preserving and 
enhancing ecosystems related to agriculture and forestry; promoting resource efficiency and 
supporting the shift towards a low carbon and climate resilient economy in agriculture, food 
and forestry sectors; and promoting social inclusion, poverty reduction and economic 
development in rural areas (art. 5 of Regulation No. 1305/2013)33. All those priorities shall 
contribute to the cross-cutting objectives of innovation, environment and climate change 
mitigation and adaptation (art. 5 in fine). Going further, the Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) No 807/2014 of 11 March 2014 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 
1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development 
by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and introducing 
transitional provisions34 provides for a long list of considerations of the regulation at stake, 
and among them there are such values as: young farmers; farm and forest exchange schemes 
and visits; farm and business development; afforestation and creation of woodland; agri-
environment-climate; conservation of genetic resources in agriculture and in forestry; animal 
welfare; cooperation (art. 1 of Commission Delegated Regulation No 807/2014). 
 As one can see, the variety of the objectives, aims, tasks, etc. has changed 
tremendously over last years. It has become much more compound and differentiated.  
 
III. COMPETITION RULES IN THE EU AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
 Generally speaking, under the European Union courts’ judicature all the general 
competition rules are binding upon every sector of the economy irrespectively, as far as 
TFEU does not provide for a particular exclusion35,36. 
 As far as agricultural sector concerned, the Treaty provides for an explicit exclusion 
from EU competition rules. According to art. 42 of TFEU all competition rules from articles 
101-109 TFEU shall apply to production of and trade in agricultural products only to the 
extent determined by the European Parliament and the Council in compliance with general 
principles and objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Rural 
Development37. The mentioned regulation gives to the European Parliament and the 
Commission a competence to enact rules introducing Common Agricultural Policy, providing 
mentioned institutions with quite wide  discretion38. 
 It is worth to note that the exclusion from general rules on competition provided for 
agricultural sector is the only one explicit exclusion introduced by TFEU39. 
                                                          
33 In fact those listed priorities are much more complex under art. 5 of Regulation No. 1305/2013 (each of listed 
priorities includes a list of areas of a special focus). 
34 OJ L 227, 31.07.2014, p. 1. 
35 See Joined Cases 209-213/84 Ministère Public v. Asjès and others. E.C.R. 1986, 1425. See also: Ali Nikpay, 
Jonathan Faull in: Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay, ed., The EC Law of Competition, Oxford 1999, p. 62. 
36 See on terms: ‘exclusion’, ‘exemption’ and ‘exception’ in: TAYLOR, P.M., E.C. and U.K. Competition Law and 
Compliance: A Practical Guide, London, 1999, p. 24; and TURNER, J.D.C., “The U.K. Competition Act 1998 and 
Private Rights”, European Intellectual Property Review, No. 4 (Vol. 21)/1999, p. 182. 
37 See MATHIJSEN, P.S.R.F., A Guide to European Union Law. Ninth Edition, London, 2007, p. 348-349. 
38 See for instance Case 139/79 Maizena GmbH v Council, sec. 23. E.C.R.1980, 3393. 
39 Nevertheless, it is possible to point military industry (‘production of or trade in arms, munitions and war 
material’), or not that far ago transportation sector, as examples of other exceptions, as well. See art. 346 sec. 1 
point b of TFEU. 
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 Moreover, Common Agricultural Policy and Rural Development regulation is a 
specific regulation (lex specialis) next to common market regulation. So, consequently, 
provisions of articles 101 and 102 are applicable to the production and marketing of 
agricultural products as far as they are not yet subject to a common organization of the 
market. In another words, the general rules on competition are applicable to the agricultural 
sector and Common Agricultural Policy and Rural Development only in the lack of a specific 
particular regulation of the agricultural market40.  
 Therefore, the objectives of EU agricultural policy prevail over the general 
competition rules (Case 139/79 Maizena GmbH v. Council). 
 By those described above means there is so-called positive integration model 
accomplished within the EU agricultural sector.  
 At present, a specific scope of the exclusion from the EU general competition rules is 
regulated by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1184/2006 of 24 July 2006 applying certain rules 
of competition to the production of and trade in certain agricultural products41. Mentioned 
Regulation repealed previous Regulation No. 26/62 of 4 April 1962 r.42 
 According to art. 2 of Council Regulation No. 1184/2006, the prohibition laid down in 
art. 101 sec. 1 of TFEU (prohibition of anticompetitive agreements, concerted practices and 
decisions by an association of undertakings) is not applicable to agreements, decisions and 
practices referred which form an integral part of a national market organisation or are 
necessary for attainment of the objectives set out in article 39 of the Treaty. Prohibition in art. 
101 sec. 1 TFEU shall not apply, in particular, to agreements, decisions and practices of 
farmers, farmers' associations, or associations of such associations belonging to a single 
Member State which concern the production or sale of agricultural products or the use of joint 
facilities for the storage, treatment or processing of agricultural products, and under which 
there is no obligation to charge identical prices, unless the Commission finds that competition 
is thereby excluded or that the objectives of Article 39 of the Treaty are jeopardised. 
 The Court of Justice ruled, on the ground of previous regulation of the subject matter 
laid down by Regulation No. 26 of 4 April 1962 where there were words “…in particular…” 
as well (art. 2 sec. 1 of Regulation 26), that given phrase is not merely of an illustrative nature 
and it does constitute a separate exclusion in fact43. Henceforward, taking into consideration 
that those two regulations have identical wording (viz. phrase “…in particular”), it is possible 
to claim that there are three distinctive exclusions furnished by Regulation No. 1184/2006, as 
well. 
 The first exclusion refers to national agricultural market organizations.  The national 
organization is defined as a totality of legal devices, placing the regulation of the market in 
                                                          
40 See numerous European courts’ cases like: Case 91/78 Hansen GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Flensburg, E.C.R. 
1979, 935 (especially sections 10-11); Case 177/78 Pigs and Bacon Commission v. McCarren and Company 
Limited, E.C.R.  1979, 2169; Case 68/86 United Kingdom v. Commission (Agricultural Hormones), E.C.R. 1988, 
855; Case C-331/88 The Queen v. The Minister of Agriculture, ex. p. Fédération Européenne de la Santé Animale 
(FEDESA) and others, E.C.R. 1990, I-4023. 
41 OJ L 214, 4.08.2006, p. 7. 
42 Council Regulation No 26 of 4 April 1962 applying certain rules of competition to production of and trade in 
agricultural products. OJ B 30, 20.04.1962, p. 993.  
43 See Joint Cases C-319/93, C-40/94, and C-224/94 Hendrik Evert Dijkstra v. Friesland (Frico Domo) Coöperatie 
BA and Cornelis van Roessel and others v. De coöperatieve vereniging Zuivelcoöperatie Campina Melkunie VA 
and Willem de Bie and others v. De Coöperatieve Zuivelcoöperatie Campina Melkunie BA., E.C.R.1995, I-4471. 
CMLR 1996, No. 5, p. 178. 
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the products in question under the control of the public authority, with a view to ensuring, by 
means of an increase in productivity and of optimum utilization of the factors of production, 
in particular of manpower, a fair standard of living for producers, the stabilization of markets, 
the assurance of supplies and reasonable prices to consumers44. Consequently, the national 
organization is understood as an organization of a national level which constitutes an integral 
part of national system of organizing agricultural markets with aims as defined in art. 39 
TFEU. The decisions and agreements of the organizations must implement the state 
regulation of the market concerned. Therefore, they ought to form an integral part of the 
national market organization in question45. The lack of an organization of the market at 
national level precludes a limine a legal possibility to call upon the exclusion46. In addition, 
this exclusion may be applicable only in case when there is no common EU market 
organization in the particular agricultural sector47. 
 The second exclusion refers to agreements, decisions and practices which are 
indispensable to accomplish the objectives of Common Agricultural Policy as furnished by 
art. 39 TFEU. The Court of Justice ruled, on the ground of previous Regulation No. 26, that 
an organization shall intend to achieve all the objectives prescribed in art. 39 TFEU, not only 
a few of them48. This exclusion may be applicable only of case of lack of EU market 
organization in the particular agricultural sector, too49. 
 The third, last exclusion from art. 101 sec 1 TFEU prohibition refers specifically to 
farmers’ organizations and associations. This exclusion encompasses agreements 
between/among farmers and farmers’ cooperatives50. Consequently, only farmers may be 
members of mentioned organizations, associations or cooperatives. Other entities, like 
intermediaries or wholesalers, are here excluded51. 
 Nevertheless, there are certain limits of this exclusion from art. 101 TFEU prohibition. 
Such agreements and other practices cannot destroy totally the competition on the market, and 
they cannot contradict the objectives of Common Agricultural Policy as laid down in art. 39 
TFEU. According to the Court of Justice the articles of association (statutes) which provided 
for exclusive supply from their members and which established a high fee for a withdrawal 
from a cooperative were not covered by the exclusion52. 
                                                          
44 See Case 48/74 Charmasson v. Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance ECR 1974, 1383. Additionally, see 
Commission Decision of 18 December 1987 No. 88/109/EEC (IV/31.735, New Potatoes), OJ L 59, 4.03.1988, p. 
25 (see page 28). See also Case 71/74 Nederlandse Vereniging voor Fruit en Groentenimporthandel and others 
(FRUBO) v. Commission, E.C.R. 1974, 563. 
45 See Commission Decision of 18 December 1987 No. 88/109/EEC (IV/31.735, New Potatoes), ibidem, p. 29. 
46 See Commission Decision of 25 July 1974 No. 74/433/EEC (FRUBO), Part III sec. 2; E.C.R. 237, 29.08.1974, p. 
16. 
47 See Commission Decision of 2 December 1977 No. 78/66/EEC (Groupement d’Expertation du Léon „GREX” – 
Cauliflowers), Part III point 1. OJ L 21, 26.01.1978, p. 23.  
48 See Case 71/74 (FRUBO).  
49 See, for example, Case C-265/97P Coöperatieve Vereniging De Verenigde Bloemenveilingen Aalsmeer BA 
(VBA) v. Florimex BV and Vereniging van Groothandelaren in Bloemkwekerijproducten (VGB), E.C.R.  2000, I-
2061. 
50 See Case C-399/93 H. G. Oude Luttikhuis and others v. Verenigde Coöperatieve Melkindustrie Coberco BA. 
E.C.R. 1995, I-4515. CMLR 1996 No. 5, p. 178. 
51 Intermediaries in the agricultural markets are undertakings, but they are not farmers as such. See Commission 
Decision No. 74/433/EEC (FRUBO), supra, Part III sec. 1. 
52 See Case C-399/93, supra. See additionally Joint Cases C-319/93, C-40/94, and C-224/94, supra. On the other 
hand, it is worth to note that contributions levied compulsory for all members of the organizations (or traders), 
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 Under art. 2 sec. 2 of Council Regulation No 1184/2006 the Commission shall have an 
exclusive power, subject to review by the Court of Justice, to determine, by decision which 
shall be published, which agreements, decisions and practices fulfill the conditions specified 
in this Regulation. Such analysis of mentioned practices take place on the notion of any party 
or parties with an interest in it, or on the notion of EU institutions, or the Commission may 
take up the case on its own initiative (ex officio). 
 It must be underlined that of Council Regulation No. 1184/2006, like the previous 
Regulation No. 26, does not provide for any exclusion from the prohibition against abuse of 
dominant position as laid down in art. 102 of TFEU53. 
 
 EU organization of the agricultural markets is provided now-a-days by Regulation 
(EU) No. 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 
establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing 
Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) 
No 1234/200754. Under the mentioned Regulation agricultural products are divided into (art. 1 
of Regulation No. 1308/2013): cereals, rice, sugar, dried fodder, seeds hops, olive oil and 
table olives, flax and hemp, fruit and vegetables, processed fruit and vegetable products, 
bananas, wine, live trees and other plants, bulbs, roots and the like, cut flowers and 
ornamental foliage, tobacco, beef and veal, milk and milk products, pigmeat, sheepmeat and 
goatmeat, eggs, poultrymeat, ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin, apiculture products, 
silkworms, and other products (like horses, asses, mules and hinnies, coconuts, Brazil nuts 
and cashew nuts, fresh or dried, whether or not shelled or peeled, other nuts, vanilla, 
cinnamon, cane sugar, other fermented beverages like for example, cider, perry, mead, etc. 
etc.).  
 For instance, in the milk market (so-called ‘Milk Package’) under art. 148 of 
Regulation No. 1308/2013 Member States have the possibility to make written contracts 
between farmers and processors compulsory and to oblige purchasers of milk to offer farmers 
a minimum contract duration. Those mentioned contracts lay down the responsibilities of 
operators in the dairy chain, increase awareness of market signals, improve price 
transmission, adapt supply to demand and avoid certain unfair commercial practices. 
Furthermore, these contracts should be made in advance of delivery and contain specific 
elements such as the price, volume, duration, details concerning payment, collection and rules 
for force majeure. All contract clauses have to be freely negotiated between the parties. 
Farmers have the right to refuse an offer of a minimum duration in a contract. Deliveries by a 
farmer-member to his cooperative are exempted from this contract obligation if the statutes or 
rules of the coop contain provisions that have similar effects as the prescribed contract. It is 
rightly stated that “After abolition of the milk quota system, they are a useful tool for 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
moreover contributions that are rendered with administrative measures, are not regarded as state aid under the 
Treaty. See: Case C-345/02 Pearle BV and Others v. Hoofdbedrijfschap Ambachten, E.C.R. 2004, I-7139; and 
C-677/11 Doux Élevage SNC, Coopérative agricole UKL-ARREE v. Ministère de l’Agriculture, de 
l’Alimentation, de la Pêche, de la Ruralité et de l’Aménagement du territoire, Comité interprofessionnel de la 
dinde française (CIDEF), OJ C 225, 3.08.2013, p. 21, E.C.R. 2013. 
53 See JURCEWICZ., A., KOZŁOWSKA, B., TOMKIEWICZ., E., supra, p. 38. See additionally WHISH, R., 
Competition Law, Fifth Edition, Lexis Nexis UK, 2003, p. 921. See also Case T-70/92 and T-71/92 Florimex BV 
and Vereniging van Groothandelaren in Bloemkwekerijprodukten v. Commission, E.C.R. 1997, II-693, and 
following Case C-265/97P, E.C.R. 2000, I-2061. 
54 OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, 671. 
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producers and processors to plan their production volumes”55. 
 The collective bargaining in the milk sector is regulated by art. 149 of Regulation No. 
1308/2013. This rule reinforces the bargaining power of milk producers. Farmers can join 
together in producer organisations (PO) that can negotiate collectively the contracts terms 
including the price of the raw milk. The volume of milk that a PO can negotiate is bound by 
certain clearly defined limits (i.e. 3.5% of the EU production, 33% of the national production 
of the Member State). Nevertheless, deliveries by member farmers to their processing 
cooperatives are not allowed to be subject of joint negotiations. But collecting cooperatives 
can form producer organisations (Pos) which can negotiate collectively with processors. 
 The producers organizations and their recognition procedure by Member States are 
regulated by arts. 152-155 of Regulation No. 1308/2013. The objectives of producers 
organizations are prescribed by art. 152 sec. 1 (c). Among those objectives there are: ensuring 
that production is planned and adjusted to demand, particularly in terms of quality and 
quantity; concentration of supply and the placing on the market of the products produced by 
its members, including through direct marketing; optimising production costs and returns on 
investments in response to environmental and animal welfare standards, and stabilising 
producer prices; carrying out research and developing initiatives on sustainable production 
methods, innovative practices, economic competitiveness and market developments; 
promoting, and providing technical assistance for, the use of environmentally sound 
cultivation practices and production techniques, and sound animal welfare practices and 
techniques; promoting, and providing technical assistance for, the use of production 
standards, improving product quality and developing products with a protected designation of 
origin, with a protected geographical indication or covered by a national quality label; the 
management of by-products and of waste in particular to protect the quality of water, soil and 
landscape and preserving or encouraging biodiversity; contributing to a sustainable use of 
natural resources and to climate change mitigation; developing initiatives in the area of 
promotion and marketing; managing of the mutual funds; and providing the necessary 
technical assistance for the use of the futures markets and of insurance schemes. 
 Generally, all recognized POs focus on cow’s milk, except one solely for ewe’s milk 
in Spain. A large number of the total 228 POs in the EU dairy sector, notably in Germany and 
Italy, already existed before the Milk Package came into force. However, the number 
recognitions has increased in 201356. 
 Producers organizations may form associations, which shall be recognized by Member 
States (art. 156 of Regulation No. 1308/2013). 
 Furthermore, there is a possibility to form Interbranch Organizations which are 
constituted of representatives of economic activities linked to the production and to at least 
one of the following stages of the supply chain: the processing of or trade in, including 
distribution of, products in one or more sectors. The Interbranch Organizations have to be 
formed on the initiative of all or some of the organisations or associations which constitute 
them. Moreover, they ought to pursue specific objectives listed by art. 157 sec. 1 (c) of 
Regulation No. 1308/2013 (like e.g. helping to coordinate better the way the products are 
placed on the market, in particular by means of research and market studies, or exploring 
potential export markets). 
                                                          
55 “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Development of the dairy market 
situation and the operation of the ‘Milk Package’ provisions”, Brussels 13.06.2014, COM(2014) 354 final, pp. 3-5. 
56 Ibidem, pp. 5-6. 
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 All described above different farmer associations and their specific activities in the milk 
market would fall within the scope of prohibition of art. 101 sec. TFEU. However, they are 
excluded from the prohibition under art. 2 sec. 1 of Council Regulation No. 1184/2006. 
 
IV. Latest developments within EU agricultural policy. Final conclusions 
 The exclusion of EU agricultural sector and farmers and their organizations from the 
prohibition of anticompetitive agreements is aimed directly to protect European farmers against a 
fierce global competition and against powerful undertakings which purchase (purchasing 
centers) and process agricultural products.  
 It is relevant in this context that small family farms account for 95 percent of all farms in 
the EU. In addition to that, small farms under two hectares (five acres) constitute approximately 
50 percent of all 12.2 million farms all over the EU. At the same time big farms of over 200 
hectares (247 acres) constitute 50 percent of farmland and only 2.7 percent of overall farms 
number. This led to transfer of big amount of funding generally to large farms, as historically the 
funding was connected with acreage with more intensive production. Now it is to be changed. 
The funds shall be more available to small farms.  
 Another problem relates to the average age of family farmers, which is over 50. at 
present. This is a big problem of a demographic nature57. Thus it is necessary to support young 
farmers in many ways as to provide for incentives for them to make them stay on their farms.  
 It is the nature of the agricultural sector that farmers, especially small family kind of 
farms, are weak and without an enough contractual power vis-á-vis economically powerful and 
strong food and agricultural industry58. Consequently, it seems quite justified politically and 
socially to provide farmers with a certain privilege (kind of ‘positive discrimination’ right) which 
may enforce the farmers’ position next to big business units. Withal, such an exclusion from 
general rules on competition (specifically anticompetitive agreements prohibition) has been 
introduced by many countries all over the world, including USA, since early 20. of the XX 
century59.  
 Consequently, certain limits to competition on agricultural markets seem to be justifiable. 
The necessity to promote and to protect small family farms as an element of democratic and 
liberal state is recognized in many countries60. Such an attitude may be compared with special 
approach towards small and medium undertakings. However, it is essential to note that there are 
many attempts towards deregulation of agricultural markets, both in the USA61 and within the 
EU62. Mentioned deregulation prima facie should mean more free market and more competition 
                                                          
57 See READ, P.K., supra. 
58 See “Competition: Commission launches study on choice and innovation in food sector. European Commission 
Press Release”, 11 December 2012, IP/12/1356. 
59 See American Clayton Act of 1914, October 15, 1914, Ch. 323, §§ 1-15, 38 Stat. 730. 15 U.S.C. Sections 12-27; 
and Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 388 (1922). See in addition COHEN, D., GERBER, A.B., “Organized 
Labor or the Sherman Act”, National Lawyers Guild Quarterly, Vol. 2/April 1939, p. 106 ff; and DABBAH, M.M., 
International and Comparative Competition Law, Cambridge, New York, 2010, pp. 244-245. 
60 See LAUCK, J., American Agriculture and the Problem of Monopoly: The Political Economy of Grain Belt 
Farming 1953-1980, The University of Nebraska Press, 2000, p. 4. 
61 American Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-127), called “Freedom to Farm 
Act”. See LAUCK, J., ibidem, p. 4 ff, especially p. 21 ff. 
62 See: “Agriculture and Food. Overview”, retrieved on October 5, 2014, in 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/agriculture/overview_en.html. 
Rules on competition in the EU agriculture sector. Latest developments in the light of the cap reform 2014-2020 
Revista de Estudios Jurídicos nº 15/2015(Segunda Época)  
ISSN 2340-5066. Universidad de Jaén (España)  
Versión electrónica: rej.ujaen.es 
 
- 15 - 
inside the agricultural sector. The latest crucial reform of EU agricultural policy was began in 
2013. As the Commission explains in its document titled ‘Overview of CAP Reform 2014-
2020’: “To achieve the long-term goals for the CAP, the reform focuses on the 
competitiveness and sustainability of the agricultural sector by improving the targeting and 
efficiency of policy instruments”. One of key elements with aim to enhance competitiveness 
of the EU agriculture is the gradual removal of production constraints (limits) in certain 
markets, viz. sugar (sugar quotas shall be abolished in 2017), diary (milk and butter; diary 
quotas expire in 2015), and wine (wine market shall be opened in 2018)63. At the same time 
producers co-operation under both pillars of the CAP shall be reinforced by different 
measures. The legal framework extends the possibility for collective bargaining (in many 
agricultural markets) and for delivery contract (in all agricultural markets) to producers 
organizations, associations of organizations and interbranch organizations. Moreover, there 
are additional exclusions from general competition rules in periods of severe market 
imbalance for certain actions, like market withdrawal or storage. There are many measures of 
support for establishment of farmer (producer) groups and for cooperation, creation of local 
food systems and cutting supply chain in food markets64. So, paradoxically, strengthening the 
competition in the EU agriculture and making the sector more market-oriented does not 
necessarily means enforcing general competition rules in the sector. And ‘deregulation’ does 
not mean opening of the market with less regulation. Therefore, agriculture is not left merely 
to market forces. In these terms, the ‘Milk Package’ is a good example of a new specific 
regulation of the market. The CAP reform 2014-2020 does in fact provide for more state 
interventionism. According to liberal economists the best de lege ferenda solution might be 
the full opening of the market, meaning abrogation of the whole CAP (including rural 
development). That may result, however, with bankruptcy of entire agricultural sector in EU.  
It must be underlined, that the present EU interventionism focuses on different aims that it 
used to in the past65. At the same time the variety of means are adjusted. So the Policy became 
more ‘intelligent’. It is also visible that the reform at stake is an attempt to rationalize and 
optimize the CAP to make it compatible with the modern agriculture and its needs in the 
modern world.  
                                                          
63 “Overview of CAP Reform 2014-2020”, supra, p. 5. 
64Ibidem, pp. 5-6. 
65 See ibidem, pp. 2-3: “The New Policy continues along this reform path, moving from product to producer 
support and now to a more land-based approach. This is in response to the challenges facing the sector, many of 
which are driven by factors that are external to agriculture. (…) Since the role of the CAP is to provide a policy 
framework that supports and encourages producers to address these challenges while remaining coherent with 
other EU policies, this translates into three long-term CAP objectives: viable food production, sustainable 
management of natural resources and climate action and balanced territorial development. To achieve these long-
term goals, the existing CAP instruments had to be adapted. The reform therefore focused on the operational 
objectives of delivering more effective policy instruments, designed to improve the competitiveness of the 
agricultural sector and its sustainability over the long term”. In short, EU agriculture needs to attain higher levels 
of production of safe and quality food, while preserving the natural resources that agricultural productivity 
depends upon. This can only be achieved by a competitive and viable agricultural sector operating within a 
properly functioning supply chain and which contributes to the maintenance of a thriving rural economy. In 
addition, to achieve these long-term goals, better targeting of the available CAP budget will be needed”. See 
additionally: TROITINO, D.R., CHOCHIA, A., supra, pp. 47-49. 
